

1                                   **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
2                                   **DISTRICT OF NEVADA**

3           United States of America,

Case No.: 2:13-cr-00039-JAD-VCF

4                   Plaintiff

5           v.

**Order Regarding  
Tax-loss/Restitution**

6           Ramon Desage, et. al,

7                   Defendants

8           Ramon Desage pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the United States.<sup>1</sup> Although he  
9 admits in his plea agreement to conspiring to cause fraudulent federal income tax returns to be  
10 filed for himself and his entities for the tax years 2006–09,<sup>2</sup> the parties dispute the amount of the  
11 tax loss and leave that valuation to the court. For two days of evidentiary hearings,<sup>3</sup> they  
12 presented the testimony of competing experts and their reports, and then summarized their  
13 respective positions in post-hearing briefs.<sup>4</sup> Having synthesized all this information, I conclude  
14 that Desage’s loss amount for sentencing and restitution purposes is \$28,221,767. I refer this  
15 case to the U.S. Probation Office to prepare a Presentencing Investigation Report and reset  
16 Desage’s sentencing hearing for September 23, 2019, at 2 p.m.

17                                   **Background**

18           The parties are intimately familiar with the six-year history of this prosecution, so I don’t  
19 repeat it here. For purposes of this order, the story begins when Desage pled guilty on August  
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21 <sup>1</sup> ECF No. 285.

22 <sup>2</sup> *Id.* at 4.

23 <sup>3</sup> Transcripts of Evidentiary Hearing (“Tr.”) at ECF Nos. 301 (Nov. 16, 2018) and 313 (Dec. 28, 2018).

<sup>4</sup> ECF Nos. 326, 336, 338. After stipulated extensions, briefing was completed on May 31, 2019.

1 31, 2018, to Count 1 in the Second Superseding Indictment,<sup>5</sup> charging him with conspiracy to  
2 defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. In his plea agreement,<sup>6</sup> Desage admits  
3 that he conspired and agreed with his bookkeeper Gary Parkinson and tax-preparer Peter  
4 Akaragian “to cause fraudulent federal income tax returns to be filed” for himself and his entities  
5 for tax years 2006–09 “to avoid the taxation of portions of income” he “received and thus to  
6 defraud the Internal Revenue Service and the United States.”<sup>7</sup> He explains that he knew his  
7 returns and supporting items were fraudulent because “they omitted payments” to him “that were  
8 taxable as income and created certain false business expense deductions, thereby reducing [his]  
9 taxable income and tax due.”<sup>8</sup> “These books and records reclassified” his “personal expenses”—  
10 like payments to his “female companions for cars, houses, and jewelry”; payments for his  
11 gambling debts and home improvements; purchases of luxury cars, real property, and personal  
12 gifts; and transfers among his various entities—to business expenses.<sup>9</sup>

13 The parties stipulated in the plea agreement “that, prior to sentencing,” the court would  
14 conduct “an evidentiary hearing on the tax loss/restitution figure to be used in sentencing”  
15 Desage “and imposing any restitution obligation.”<sup>10</sup> They also agreed “to be bound by the  
16 Court’s tax loss/restitution figure in arguing” Desage’s offense-level calculation and sentence.<sup>11</sup>

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19 <sup>5</sup> ECF No. 59.

20 <sup>6</sup> ECF No. 285.

21 <sup>7</sup> *Id.* at 4, ¶ 1; *see also* Tr. at 20, 53 (wherein defense expert Aloian describes the roles of  
Akaragian and Parkinson).

22 <sup>8</sup> *Id.* at 5, ¶ 2.

23 <sup>9</sup> *Id.* at 5, ¶ 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 6.

<sup>11</sup> *Id.*

1 At that evidentiary hearing, which was held over two days, the government presented the  
2 testimony of one of the IRS Revenue Agents (RA) on this case, Evelyn K. Fall, and of the case  
3 agent, Special Agent (SA) Julie Bomstad. Fall testified that Desage underreported and underpaid  
4 his income tax by \$28,221,767 for tax years 2006–09.<sup>12</sup> But Desage aims to neutralize the  
5 impact of his plea-agreement admissions by arguing that he could have claimed tens of millions  
6 of dollars more in tax deductions that would have wiped out his entire tax deficiency. To support  
7 that position, Desage offered the testimony of his CPA Michael Aloian, who opined that Desage  
8 owes no tax because Desage, a prolific high roller, had unaccounted-for cash floating around  
9 from casino-gaming cash-outs, and he used \$28.6 million of that cash to repay loans and fund  
10 other business expenses, offsetting the entirety of this tax obligation.<sup>13</sup>

11 The parties presented post-hearing briefs summarizing their burdens and how the  
12 evidence satisfies them.<sup>14</sup> In its brief, the government walks through the testimony of RA Fall  
13 and how her careful analysis establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that Desage evaded  
14 paying \$28,221,767 in income tax for the years 2006–09. It argues that Desage failed to meet his  
15 burden to show that his tax balance is wiped out by unclaimed business-expense deductions  
16 because Aloian used a flawed methodology to support his theory and a “self-serving switch in  
17 accounting methods” that renders his computation unreliable.<sup>15</sup> Desage responds that Aloian’s  
18 calculation method is the right one and maintains that currency transaction reports (CTRs)

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19 <sup>12</sup> See Tr. at 93–94.

20 <sup>13</sup> See Tr. at 46, 302–04. Defense counsel sought to present testimony from themselves and  
21 Desage as the scheduled two-day hearing was wrapping up. See Tr. at 316–18; ECF No. 309,  
22 310 (defense brief and errata re: additional witnesses); ECF No. 311 (government response);  
ECF No. 312 (defense reply). But I denied that request and set a briefing schedule for post-  
hearing briefs. See ECF No. 316.

23 <sup>14</sup> ECF Nos. 326, 336, 338.

<sup>15</sup> ECF No. 326.

1 reflecting casino cash-outs to Desage and anecdotal evidence from Desage’s lenders show that  
2 “the total cash paid for deductible expenses related to loans (e.g., interest and funding fees) was  
3 approximately \$28.6 million . . . .”<sup>16</sup> The government replies that CTRs are not an accurate tool  
4 for determining Desage’s cash on hand and, regardless, Desage has not shown—and cannot  
5 show—that he used those millions to pay legitimate business expenses, particularly when he  
6 admits in his plea agreement that he falsely characterized years of personal expenses as  
7 deductible business expenses. And it stresses that Aloian’s calculations are based on pure  
8 speculation.<sup>17</sup> Assisted by these briefs, I carefully evaluate the evidence presented by both sides.

### 9 **Discussion**

10 The parties agree on the legal standards for determining Desage’s tax-loss amount. “The  
11 government bears the burden of establishing the base offense level, and, hence, here, the amount  
12 of tax loss, by a preponderance of the evidence.”<sup>18</sup> A precise calculation is not required, and the  
13 Sentencing Guidelines advise the court to “simply make a reasonable estimate based on the  
14 available facts” when the amount of the tax loss is uncertain.<sup>19</sup>

15 Courts may also consider a defendant’s unclaimed tax deductions in estimating the tax  
16 loss for sentencing purposes if, among other factors, the deduction “is reasonably and practicably  
17 ascertainable.”<sup>20</sup> “The burden is on the defendant to establish any such . . . deduction . . . by a

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20 <sup>16</sup> ECF No. 336 at 9.

21 <sup>17</sup> ECF No. 338.

22 <sup>18</sup> *United States v. Montano*, 250 F.3d 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing *United States v. Howard*,  
894 F.2d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 1990)).

23 <sup>19</sup> U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 application note 1.

<sup>20</sup> *Id.* application note 3.

1 preponderance of the evidence.”<sup>21</sup> And a court is not required “to speculate about tax deductions  
2 that the taxpayer chose not to claim.”<sup>22</sup>

3  
4 **A. The government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Desage’s tax-loss  
amount was \$28,221,767 for TY 2006–09.**

5 The government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Desage’s admittedly  
6 fraudulent tax shenanigans created a tax loss of \$28,221,767 for tax years 2006 through 2009.  
7 The analysis performed by well-qualified and veteran revenue agent Fall<sup>23</sup> established that she  
8 evaluated Desage’s tax obligations beginning with a blank slate and used bank records,  
9 documentation underlying the claimed expenses and unreported income, and memoranda of  
10 interviews to piece together a true picture of Desage’s activity<sup>24</sup> despite the state of his own  
11 books and records, which his own expert characterized as “inadequate.”<sup>25</sup> Working through each  
12 of the tax years at issue, Fall identified scores of fraudulent deductions, like personal purchases  
13 of homes, cars, furs, and jewelry for girlfriends and acquaintances falsely claimed as business  
14 expenses; arbitrarily inflated expenses; and non-deductible book-to-book transfers.<sup>26</sup> She  
15 pointed out tens of millions in unreported or hidden income.<sup>27</sup> But she also gave Desage the  
16 benefit of any true deduction, including loan interest, funding fees, or commissions.<sup>28</sup> Fall  
17 concluded after this detailed and extensive analysis that Desage underreported and underpaid his

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19 <sup>21</sup> *Id.*

20 <sup>22</sup> *United States v. Yip*, 592 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010).

21 <sup>23</sup> Tr. at 88–89.

22 <sup>24</sup> Tr. at 90–94.

23 <sup>25</sup> Tr. at 16:12–14.

24 <sup>26</sup> Tr. at 94–99, 107–08.

25 <sup>27</sup> Tr. at 96, 98, 106–07, 117–18.

26 <sup>28</sup> Tr. at 101–110, 126–27.

1 income tax obligation by \$28,221,767 for tax years 2006–09. I found her analysis well  
2 supported and her testimony and methodology credible.

3 Desage argues that RA Fall’s methodology is “fraught with problems” and inaccurate  
4 because “she relied on” Desage’s tax preparer’s “calculations from the single-entry system and  
5 deal sheets that were unreliable,” “ignor[ing] the income statement, balance sheet, and  
6 QuickBooks provided by Mr. Aloian” who recreated Desage’s books using a double-entry  
7 system and the accrual method of accounting.<sup>29</sup> But this characterization is belied by Fall’s  
8 testimonial description of the process she employed:

9 Q. Okay. So do you start with a blank slate to do your tax  
10 computation and figure out what the income picture is?

11 A. I start—I started with the bank records. I input the bank  
12 deposits, the cash withdrawals for all the business bank accounts.  
13 And then I used the classifications that Peter Akaragian had on the  
14 Excel spreadsheet so I could get that to the amounts that were on  
the tax return. We don’t start from zero and—we—’cuz we have  
the tax return. The tax return was filed. There were books. My  
job is to find the differences between what’s on the tax return and  
what happened.

15 Q. And why do you do that? Why do you have to know  
16 what’s on the tax return?

17 A. Well, the identified unreported income and those expenses,  
18 you want to make sure that that unreported income was not  
reported and you want to make sure those false expenses were  
taken on the tax returns.

19 Q. So what’s the next step in your analysis?

20 A. After I got the books to go to the tax return, then I have to  
21 take a look at the underlying documentation for the false expenses  
22 and the unreported income by going through the interviews that the  
special agents did; by looking at the underlying documents that  
they have received from Grand Jury subpoenas; and then I do an  
23 analysis to make my determination.

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<sup>29</sup> ECF No. 336 at 4–5.

1 Q. Okay. So you look at all the underlying material.

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. Do you just—do you just eyeball what the person who  
4 prepared the return did and then—

5 A. No.<sup>30</sup>

6 Fall also testified that she did review Aloian's materials, but they were incomplete and left her  
7 unable to "check[] Mr. Aloian's work."<sup>31</sup> So Fall did not "ignore" Aloian's work; rather,  
8 without the back-up work papers, she was unable to validate it.<sup>32</sup>

9 Plus, the notion that Aloian's recreation of the books and records using a double-entry,  
10 accrual-based accounting system<sup>33</sup> made his calculations more accurate than Fall's overlooks  
11 critical flaws in Aloian's methodology. Aloian admitted that he began his reconstruction  
12 beginning with December 31, 2005, and simply assumed the accuracy of Desage's balance sheet  
13 from that day, despite the fact that Desage had check registers going back to 1986, the business  
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15 <sup>30</sup> Tr. at 90–92.

16 <sup>31</sup> Tr. at 247–48.

17 <sup>32</sup> *Id.*; Tr. at 275–76.

18 <sup>33</sup> Desage also criticizes Fall's use of a cash accounting method to evaluate his tax obligations  
19 when his tax returns were styled by Akaragian as accrual method. *See, e.g.*, ECF No. 336 at 13–  
20 18. I find reasonable and reliable Fall's testimony that her method was the appropriate one  
21 because, despite Akaragian's labeling of Desage's system as an accrual-basis one, it was truly a  
22 cash-based one, and it is the taxpayer's historic and consistent treatment, not mere labeling, that  
23 controls. *See* Tr. at 53–56 (Aloian cross); 99–101 (Fall direct) ("On the tax returns, they checked  
the box "accrual." But they never used the accrual method. . . . Just because the box is checked  
does not mean that that's the method that they are on."); 163–64, 170–71 (Fall redirect); *see also*  
U.S.C. § 446(b) ("Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting on the  
basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books."). This  
conclusion is further supported by the fact that an accrual-basis accounting method requires an  
understanding of the business's inventory, yet Desage didn't keep inventory records. *See* Tr. at  
129, 131, 167, 242, 244–49 (Fall testimony); 303–04 (Aloian testimony). I thus credit Fall's  
testimony on this point over Aloian's.

1 dated back to 1990, Desage had engaged in million-dollar deals before Aloian’s chosen start  
2 date, and Desage’s recordkeeping was notoriously poor.<sup>34</sup> And although the accrual method of  
3 accounting relies on the ability to track inventory balances,<sup>35</sup> Desage kept no records of his,<sup>36</sup>  
4 making Aloian’s assumptions speculative and his accounting conclusions unreliable.

5 I thus credit the testimony and conclusions of RA Fall regarding Desage’s tax obligation  
6 over the testimony and conclusions of Mr. Aloian. And I find that the government has  
7 established by a preponderance of the evidence that Desage’s outstanding tax due and owing to  
8 the IRS for tax years 2006–2009 is \$28,221,767.

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10 **B. Desage did not satisfy his burden to claim an offsetting amount of unclaimed tax deductions.**

11 Desage attempts to abrogate that balance with tens of millions of dollars in  
12 undocumented cash payments of tax-deductible business expenses. He claims that he “used  
13 large amounts of cash to pay lenders interest and funding fees.”<sup>37</sup> Though he admits that his  
14 records lack the information necessary to determine the amount of such payments, he contends  
15 that currency transaction reports (CTRs and CTR-Cs)—which are generated by banks, casinos,  
16 and other organizations each time cash of \$10,000 or more changes hands<sup>38</sup>—plus anecdotal  
17 evidence from Desage’s lenders obtained during the course of the IRS’s investigation, prove that

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21 <sup>34</sup> Tr. at 16, 20, 294–97.

22 <sup>35</sup> Tr. at 164, 242, 284, 286, 297, 303–05.

23 <sup>36</sup> Tr. at 245–47.

<sup>37</sup> ECF No. 336 at 7.

<sup>38</sup> Tr. at 35 (Aloian); at 174 (Bomstad).



1 he made “approximately \$28.6 million” in cash payments for deductible expenses related to  
2 loans during the subject time period.<sup>39</sup>

3 But that evidentiary foundation is unsound. The government established that CTRs are  
4 not a reliable tool for calculating cash on hand or tracing its path. As RA Fall explained, “just  
5 because someone takes money out of a casino and the money goes back into a bank account, you  
6 don’t know—that money could be the same money. CTRs are just information documents. You  
7 don’t know if that’s the same money just bein’ churned. That’s why I don’t rely on those.”<sup>40</sup>  
8 She elaborated with a concrete illustration when questioned by government counsel:

9 Q: . . . Why don’t you use CTRs to reconstruct income?

10 A. Because they are just info items. The money can—it could be  
11 the same money as I explained. It’s just—you don’t—you can’t  
12 trace it. It goes in; it comes out. It could be the same funds goin’  
in and out, in and out.

13 Q. So I can use a hundred dollars. And, if I use it in the correct  
14 way to generate CTRs, I can make it look like I have a million  
dollars.

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. And that could happen unintentionally also just based on a lot  
17 of churning<sup>41</sup> of transactions?  
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19 <sup>39</sup> ECF No. 336 at 7–9; Tr. 70 (Q (to Aloian): “is it fair for me to say that your conclusion as to  
20 the unclaimed deductions is that there’s an unaccounted for \$28.6 million in cash out there? A.  
Yes.”), 301–02 (Aloian).

21 <sup>40</sup> Tr. at 156–57 (Fall).

22 <sup>41</sup> See also Tr. at 165–66 (where Fall explains, “if you go to the casino and you walk out with  
23 cash that’s out of your line of credit and then you deposit it back into the business account the  
next day and then the next -- and then you wire money to pay down your credit and you go back  
the next night, use the credit, walk out again, deposit the money back into the bank account, that  
is a method of churning money,” and that Desage “was treating the casinos like a bank”).

1 A. You take the money out of the bank; you put the money back in  
2 the bank. You take the money out of the casino; you put the  
money back in the bank. It's—

3 Q. Are you familiar with any kind of method or practice of  
4 estimating cash on hand based on CTRs?

A. No.<sup>42</sup>

5 SA Bomstad corroborated RA Fall's opinion that CTRs and CTR-Cs are "not a reliable basis for  
6 determining cash on hand."<sup>43</sup> And even Mr. Aloian agreed that one cannot "determine whether  
7 or not a unique piece of money is represented by a particular CTR."<sup>44</sup>

8 Aloian also explained that he arrived at his \$28 million-in-undocumented-tax-deductible-  
9 expenses-paid-with-cash theory "based on what Mr. Desage has told [him]" and just used the  
10 CTRs, CTR-Cs, and other evidence gathered by the IRS "as corroboration."<sup>45</sup> But even those  
11 CTRs fail to show that Desage had a cache of cash. Consistent with the old adage that Las  
12 Vegas wasn't built on winners, the government's analysis of Desage's CTR activity shows that  
13 he was actually a net loser at the casinos<sup>46</sup> and that he had a deficit of cash on hand, not a  
14 surplus—all of which belies Aloian's theory.<sup>47</sup>

15 That theory is further undermined by the anecdotal evidence of Desage's loan-repayment  
16 practices. When interviewed by the IRS, none of Desage's investors or lenders during the  
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19 <sup>42</sup> Tr. 162–63 (Fall).

20 <sup>43</sup> Tr. 176–78, 203 (Bomstad).

21 <sup>44</sup> Tr. 301 (Aloian).

22 <sup>45</sup> Tr. 301–02 ("Those things all corroborate the—the availability of the cash to pay what Mr.  
DeSage told me he paid.").

23 <sup>46</sup> Tr. at 301 (Aloian) ("Q. And have you looked at it—the gaming records show he's a  
net loser; correct? A. Yes. Q. And significantly so. A. Yes.").

<sup>47</sup> Tr. at 174–78 (Bomstad).

1 2006–09 time frame described being paid tens of millions of dollars in cash, and the  
2 government’s computations gave Desage credit for the cash payments on his debts that Desage  
3 or third parties had record of.<sup>48</sup> Desage highlights as “[t]he strongest corroboration” of these  
4 “large cash payments” the fact that one lender, William Richardson, “confirmed and documented  
5 that in a 10 month period he received in excess of \$6.6 million cash from” Desage “for lending”  
6 Desage money.<sup>49</sup> Aloian’s undocumented-cash theory relies on an “extrapolation . . . [from]  
7 Desage’s kind of way of doing business with William Richardson.”<sup>50</sup> But the corroborative  
8 strength of the Richardson evidence is overstated because it relates to different tax years than the  
9 ones at issue here.<sup>51</sup>

10 Aloian also conceded that his extrapolation approach is not based on GAAP or any IRS  
11 instruction.<sup>52</sup> So, in an effort to legitimize it, Aloian notes that some courts have recognized that  
12 an approximation of a taxpayer’s tax-deductible expenses can be appropriate when there is  
13 “some basis for computation”—like Judge Learned Hand did when holding in 1930 that  
14 Broadway showman and Yankee Doodle Dandy George M. Cohan was likely entitled to some  
15 entertainment- and travel-expense deductions despite keeping no spending records.<sup>53</sup> But the  
16 Ninth Circuit recognized in *Norgaard v. Commissioner*<sup>54</sup> that the *Cohan* rule has limited

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18 <sup>48</sup> Tr. at 152–55, 161–62, 227–30; Exh. 8 (memo of interview with H. Vechery); Exh. 9 (memo  
19 of interview of H. Frey); Exh. 10 (memo of interview of Y. Hefetz); Exh. 11 (memo of interview  
of P. Akaragian) (“DESAGE has a gambling problem. . . . His gambling winnings and also  
unspent cash from casino markers get deposited into his business bank account.”).

20 <sup>49</sup> ECF No. 336 at 9.

21 <sup>50</sup> Tr. at 71–72 (Aloian).

22 <sup>51</sup> *Id.*

<sup>52</sup> Tr. at 72–73 (Aloian).

23 <sup>53</sup> *Cohan v. Comm. of Internal Revenue*, 39 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1930); Tr. at 72–73 (Aloian).

<sup>54</sup> *Norgaard v. Comm. of Internal Revenue*, 939 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1991).

1 application. It gives the tax court “considerable latitude in estimating the amount of the  
2 allowable deduction” but “does not ‘require that such latitude be employed’” by the district court  
3 reviewing a tax-court decision.<sup>55</sup> Desage has provided nothing to suggest that the *Cohan* rule  
4 has been extended to criminal tax-loss calculations to displace the recognized standards that  
5 “[t]he burden is on the defendant to establish any such . . . deduction . . . by a preponderance of  
6 the evidence”<sup>56</sup> and that a district court is not required “to speculate about tax deductions that the  
7 taxpayer chose not to claim.”<sup>57</sup>

8 Even if I were persuaded to extend the *Cohan* rule to the criminal context, I could not  
9 justify it here. The *Cohan* court remanded to “reconsider the evidence” because it was obvious  
10 to the court that Cohan would have incurred such deductible expenses but the Board made a  
11 blanket denial “on the ground that it was impossible to tell how much he had spent, in the  
12 absence of any items or details.”<sup>58</sup> It is not similarly obvious here that Desage made tens of  
13 millions of dollars in cash payments that he could have written off. The government has  
14 foreclosed that assumption with its CTR analysis that shows that Desage had a deficit, not  
15 surplus of cash; that the cash loan repayments have been accounted for in the government’s  
16 calculations; and that Desage’s fondness for lavish-lifestyle expenditures—often funded by  
17 loans<sup>59</sup>—like fur coats, luxury automobiles, and private jet travel,<sup>60</sup> makes it more likely that  
18 Desage’s cash, if any, was blown on things that weren’t tax deductible. And, unlike Cohan,  
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20 <sup>55</sup> *Id.* at 879 (quoting *Williams v. United States*, 245 F.2d 559, 560 (5th Cir. 1957)).

21 <sup>56</sup> U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 application note 3.

22 <sup>57</sup> *Yip*, 592 F.3d at 1041.

23 <sup>58</sup> *Cohan*, 39 F.2d at 543.

<sup>59</sup> *See* Tr. at 254–55 (“Desage live[d] off loans”).


<sup>60</sup> *See* Tr. at 182–89.

1 Desage pled guilty to conspiring to defraud the IRS and admitted under penalty of perjury that he  
2 agreed with his bookkeeper and tax preparer to create false business-expense deductions “to  
3 avoid the taxation of portions of income” he “received and thus to defraud the Internal Revenue  
4 Service and the United States,”<sup>61</sup> undercutting the credibility of Desage’s representations that  
5 form the factual foundation of Aloian’s theory.

6 **Conclusion**

7 I thus find that the government has met its burden to show that Desage’s outstanding tax  
8 due and owing to the IRS for tax years 2006–09 is \$28,221,767. I further conclude that Desage  
9 has not met his burden to show that he made tens of millions in previously unclaimed,  
10 undocumented, tax-deductible, all-cash loan payments during the tax years in question. So I  
11 apply the figure in USSG § 2T4.1(L) (tax loss > \$25,000,000) for sentencing purposes and find  
12 that the amount of actual loss attributed to Desage’s conduct here—and thus his restitution  
13 obligation—is \$28,221,767. Sentencing will take place on September 23, 2019, at 2 p.m.

14 Dated: July 19, 2019

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16 U.S. District Judge Jennifer A. Dorsey  
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<sup>61</sup> ECF No. 285.